In the Israeli system of government, the Attorney General (originally Attorney General) holds a dual role: on one hand, as the head of the entire prosecution system, responsible for managing criminal investigations and representing the state in criminal proceedings to enforce the law; on the other hand, as the legal advisor to the government at all levels — the Prime Minister and the ministers — to ensure the government exercises its powers lawfully. In this role, the Attorney General also provides legal advice regarding legislation and represents the state in civil and administrative courts.

In recent years, the proposal to split the institution has surfaced repeatedly on the political agenda. Without delving into differences among the various proposals, the general idea is that the Attorney General would retain the role of legal advisor to the government and its branches but would no longer head the public prosecution system. This authority would be transferred to the State Attorney, who would no longer be subordinate to the Attorney General’s office.

Although the judicial system is now a central topic in political debates and the issue seems to be at the heart of the storm, it has been on the political agenda for decades. In fact, in 1997, a committee (“the Shamgar Committee”) was established to examine the matter and concluded that splitting the role would not be appropriate. The government at that time adopted the committee’s recommendations.

The Office of the Attorney General has operated in its current form since the establishment of the State of Israel. The existing role is based on traditions and practices that have taken root in the legal and governmental system. Therefore, such a fundamental change is likely to cause significant upheaval. Thus, the burden of persuasion falls on those advocating for the change.

As with any institutional change, there is often a distinction between reasons and motives. Different actors may propose changes motivated by non-neutral interests, such as the effect of the current structure on their personal affairs or a desire to weaken the rule of law in Israel. While these motivations cast a shadow over the substantive debate, it is important to first understand the principal arguments for and against the change. Therefore, even if political motives exist, there are substantial arguments on both sides that warrant a serious and balanced discussion.

What are the main arguments in favor of splitting the role of the Attorney General?

The central arguments supporting the split focus on the concern about conflicts of interest arising from the dual roles of the Attorney General and the concentration of excessive power in the hands of a single public official.

The conflict of interest arises because the Attorney General advises the government and the Prime Minister on highly sensitive matters, requiring a close, trust-based relationship. However, when stepping into the role of head of the prosecution, the Attorney General may lead investigations and file indictments against members of the same government. Thus, the Attorney General must, at once, be both a close advisor and an independent prosecutor — roles requiring fundamentally different types of relationships: one of cooperation and trust, and one of distance and oversight.

This dual role creates an ongoing and significant risk of conflict of interest and erodes public trust. Although the Attorney General’s duty is to the state and the public interest rather than to individual ministers, the fact that both roles are held by the same individual cannot be ignored. Recent years have brought this conflict to the fore, with Attorney Generals simultaneously advising the government while indicting ministers, thereby reigniting the debate.

Another argument in favor of the split concerns the vast scope of the Attorney General’s powers. Today, the Attorney General is the official interpreter of the law for all government ministries and public administration bodies; determines the state’s positions in criminal, administrative, constitutional, and international legal proceedings; and has the power to initiate or halt investigations against politicians and senior officials. Their interpretations significantly influence how the law is applied by the Supreme Court.

In a country like Israel, without a rigid and codified constitution, such concentration of power in a single unelected official raises concerns regarding the balance of powers. Based on the principle of separation of powers, developed by Montesquieu in the 18th century, there is no justification for such a concentration of unchecked authority in one person or institution.

There are also functional arguments: the workload on the Attorney General and subordinate units can impair the quality of legal work. Conflicts between the State Attorney’s views and the Attorney General’s views in criminal matters have occasionally emerged. Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect one individual to possess expertise across such distinct fields: public law (constitutional, administrative, international) and criminal law. A split would allow for leaders specialized in each domain

Just as there are serious arguments in favor of the split, there are weighty arguments against it.

The most prominent argument is that a split would weaken the Office of the Attorney General, ultimately undermining both its advisory and its prosecutorial capacities. Currently, government officials are deterred from ignoring the Attorney General’s advice because doing so could lead to criminal consequences. Separating these functions would diminish this deterrent.

It could also weaken the prosecution system: the criminal prosecution would be placed under the State Attorney, while civil and administrative cases would remain under the Attorney General — effectively splitting the prosecution internally as well.

Another major concern is the politicization of the office. By dividing the roles, the government might be tempted to appoint a “more convenient” legal advisor, knowing that criminal enforcement is handled separately. As Professor Gad Barzilai put it, the government might seek legal advisors who, “even if they can’t steal horses with them, can at least steal horses without too much interference.” Politicization could deeply damage public trust, not only in the Attorney General’s office but in the justice system as a whole.

Another, somewhat quieter but crucial concern is the potential loss of a system-wide, integrated view of legal policy. Former senior officials have emphasized the importance of having a single figure who can oversee and coordinate criminal, administrative, and civil law enforcement in a holistic way. Issues like fighting terrorism, organized crime, and racism often require a broad legal strategy — which could be compromised if the functions were split.

The 1997 Shamgar Committee already noted that the efficiency and effectiveness of the Attorney General’s office depend on the combination and coordination of different legal powers. Special attention should be given to the risk that prosecutors, left to act independently, might adopt an overly aggressive stance, while the Attorney General provides important balancing considerations from broader public interests.

Another concern is that splitting the roles could lead to friction between the new separate offices, harming law enforcement and diminishing public trust — the very outcomes the split aims to prevent.

Additionally, today, the Attorney General is the singular authoritative interpreter of the law, providing consistency, certainty, and predictability for both the government and the public. A split could undermine this uniformity, resulting in conflicting legal interpretations and applications.

The functional difficulties related to the workload and the need for expertise do not justify a complete split of the role. These challenges can be mitigated by strengthening the team under the Attorney General, rather than dismantling the institution.

The democratic concerns about concentrated power must be weighed against the critical need for holistic management of legal policy. The disadvantages of conflict of interest are real and significant — as demonstrated by recent scandals and indictments — but even so, a full separation would likely cause more harm than good.

Instead of an “all or nothing” approach, a middle-ground solution should be pursued, recognizing the complexity of the issue from public, legal, and practical perspectives.

For example, one reform could be to remove the authority to indict government ministers from the Attorney General, transferring it to the State Attorney, who does not have systematic working relationships with the government. Alternatively, a separate independent body could be created to handle corruption cases against public officials, independent from the Attorney General.

It is clear that filing indictments against a sitting minister is an exceptional, sensitive action that should be handled with maximum independence and integrity.