In all surveyed countries, the authority to appoint the Civil Service Commissioner formally lies with the government (executive authority). However, supporting mechanisms exist to provide oversight and professional evaluation of the proposed appointment. In most countries, the Commissioner is seen as a professional figure with high managerial stature.

The comparative analysis shows that extreme solutions are uncommon: an appointment process entirely at the government’s discretion is not accepted internationally. At the same time, it is also rare to find a selection process where a candidate could be appointed without government endorsement.

In determining the appointment procedure, it is important to maintain a delicate balance between the need for a competitive and professional appointment process and preserving the government’s lawful authority and historical practice of selecting the Commissioner. This balance can be achieved through several structural changes, such as setting minimum qualification requirements, convening a search committee to recommend candidates, and ensuring a balanced composition of the committee to include managerial and “gatekeeping” elements essential to the Commissioner’s role.

1. The Civil Service Commission is the central body responsible for the planning and management of human resources within Israel’s civil service. The Commissioner, who heads the Commission and reports to the Prime Minister, holds broad powers over the employment of approximately 80,000 public sector workers, the approval of organizational structures within government ministries, staffing approvals, hiring, training, promotions, and promoting excellence within the public sector.

2. The Commissioner significantly influences the professionalism, neutrality, and apolitical character of the civil service, as well as the quality of its senior leadership. The Commissioner is responsible for approving search committees for top public sector positions and is a member of the advisory committee for senior appointments.

3. Despite the importance of the position, the appointment process for the Commissioner is not codified in law or detailed government decisions. The only legal reference is Section 6 of the Civil Service Law (Appointments), 1959, which states that the government shall appoint the Commissioner and that the appointment is exempt from a tender process. The most recent government decision related to the matter is Decision No. 3793 from May 13, 2018, which stated that after the next appointment of a Civil Service Commissioner, the government would be required to develop a formal appointment procedure with the assistance of the Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Attorney General.

4. Historically, the appointment of Civil Service Commissioners in Israel has been under the authority and control of the government. In the past, the process began with a candidate proposal by the Prime Minister, continued with a review by an ad hoc appointments committee composed of a chairperson selected by the Prime Minister and public representatives chosen by the government, and concluded with government approval. No mandatory qualifications or threshold criteria for candidates were established.

5. A noteworthy precedent highlighting limitations on the government’s discretion occurred in High Court of Justice case 7455/17 Netz-Tzengot v. Prime Minister (March 29, 2018). A conditional order was initially issued to replace public representatives chosen by the government for the appointments committee. The petition was later withdrawn after the government agreed to reappoint the representatives, rendering the discussion theoretical.

6. On May 29, 2024, the Attorney General published an opinion, based on Government Decision 3793, asserting that the proposed appointment process resembling previous practices, combined with the advisory committee for senior appointments, was legally invalid.

7. Instead, the Attorney General recommended that the appointment should occur through a search committee headed by a retired Supreme Court judge (appointed by the President of the Supreme Court with the Prime Minister’s consent), comprising:

   • The Attorney General or a representative;

   • A former Civil Service Commissioner or Director-General of a core government ministry (Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice), appointed by the Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office;

   • An academic expert in public law, selected by the deans of Israeli law faculties;

   • A public representative with significant professional experience relevant to the position, appointed by the Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office with the Attorney General’s consent.

8. Structuring the appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner in Israel can benefit from a comparative look at other countries where a similar role exists. It is important to note that powers may vary, and in some countries, responsibilities equivalent to those of the Israeli Commissioner are divided among several officials. Nevertheless, this review focuses on officials holding powers most similar to the Israeli Commissioner — namely, heads of civil service bodies with authority over senior appointments, setting guidelines and procedures, and enforcing disciplinary standards.

The objective is to provide a benchmark for comparison, recognizing that normative conclusions must consider the distinct character and structure of the public service in each country.

9. The initial comparison population included all OECD countries. A preliminary review narrowed the focus to countries with a civil service commission comparable to Israel’s. Notably, such commissions are mainly found in countries with a British colonial legacy, where the “civil service commission” or “public service commission” model remains prevalent.

10. In other OECD countries, the common model places responsibility for the civil service within a ministerial department. For example, in Sweden and Finland, the Ministry of Finance oversees the civil service. In Germany and Austria, responsibility lies with the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Arts, Culture, Public Service, and Sport, respectively.

11. After filtering, the relevant comparator countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland. Nonetheless, the authority and functions are not always perfectly aligned with Israel’s Civil Service Commissioner.

12.1 Table 1 outlines the appointment processes in the comparator countries. In all examined countries where a civil service commission exists, the executive authority (Prime Minister or President) formally selects the candidate.

12.2 However, unlike Israel, every other country includes a mechanism to balance the executive’s power. Typically, a separate governmental authority must approve the candidate. In Canada, the UK, and the US, appointments require parliamentary approval. Israel remains the only country where the executive holds complete control without external oversight.

12.3 The degree of political influence over the appointment process varies:

• In the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, a competitive tender process limits the government’s freedom of choice de facto.

• In other countries, oversight is achieved through required approval by another branch of government.

12.4 Australia: The appointment is formally made by the Governor-General following a selection process involving an independent committee, after which the Prime Minister recommends a candidate.

12.5 United Kingdom: The process begins with an open competition. The Prime Minister recommends a candidate who must then undergo a hearing before a parliamentary appointments committee, followed by formal approval by the monarch.

12.6 United States: The President nominates a candidate, typically with political considerations. However, the nominee must undergo public hearings and receive Senate approval, often involving bipartisan negotiations.

12.7 Ireland: The role is divided among five officials who comprise the management board of the body overseeing public service appointments and ethics. Some are appointed by the President with parliamentary approval, others by the houses of parliament.

12.8 Canada: The Prime Minister recommends a candidate, who undergoes a review by a parliamentary committee before being voted on by both houses of Parliament. The Governor-General then formally appoints the candidate.

12.9 New Zealand: The process begins with an open competition. A shortlist is prepared, and the Prime Minister nominates a candidate, who is then formally appointed by the Governor-General.

13. Diagram 1 illustrates the different mechanisms used in each country to balance and oversee the government’s appointment power.

14. The comparative analysis shows that Israel’s historical appointment process — and the government’s current proposed mechanism — is highly unusual internationally. No surveyed country grants the government full, unchecked control over such an appointment.

15. Moreover, an appointment process without minimum qualification requirements or competition — focused on a single candidate selected solely by the government — is not institutionally optimal for such a critical position. The Civil Service Commissioner must manage two often-conflicting roles: effective administrative leadership and serving as a gatekeeper protecting against improper political appointments.

16. The Commissioner must possess the competence to lead reforms improving the quality and efficiency of the public service, while also resisting political pressure undermining merit-based appointments and sound administrative practices. The government’s proposed appointment process risks undermining, or at least appearing to undermine, the gatekeeping function.

17. Nevertheless, moving to a process where the government has no meaningful influence over the appointment would also be highly unusual and problematic given the significant departure from Israel’s historical practice. The long-standing interpretation of Section 6 of the Civil Service Law (Appointments), 1959, has left substantial discretion with the government. Changes over the years have been administrative, not legislative, and historical practice carries significant interpretive weight.

18. We believe there are various ways to achieve the proper balance between ensuring a professional, competitive appointment process and maintaining the government’s lawful authority.

19. Without exhausting all available options, a possible approach could include a combination of the following elements:

20. • Defining Minimum Qualification Requirements: Establish clear threshold conditions that candidates must meet, such as professional experience in human resources management, leadership experience in large organizations, a proven record of public service, and high ethical standards.

    • Establishing a Search Committee: Create an independent search committee responsible for identifying and recommending qualified candidates. The committee should include individuals from diverse backgrounds, such as a retired Supreme Court judge, representatives from academia (in public administration or law), former senior public officials, and possibly public representatives with expertise in governance and ethics.

    • Conducting a Competitive Selection Process: Issue a public call for applications and implement a professional screening and interview process, based on predetermined criteria, to select candidates for recommendation.

    • Maintaining Government Discretion: Allow the government to choose a candidate from among those recommended by the search committee, thus preserving the government’s traditional authority while ensuring a competitive and professional vetting process.

    • Transparency and Public Oversight: Require the publication of the selection process results, including the list of candidates considered and the rationale for selecting the final nominee, subject to legal confidentiality protections where necessary.

    • Consultation with Oversight Bodies: Institute a requirement for the candidate to appear before an appropriate parliamentary committee for consultation and discussion, even if formal approval is not mandatory. This would increase transparency and public trust without undermining governmental prerogatives.

    20. Such a structured process would:

    • Reinforce the public’s trust in the impartiality, professionalism, and independence of the Civil Service Commissioner.

    • Improve the quality of candidates considered for this critical position.

    • Protect the balance between the government’s right to appoint senior officials and the public interest in a professional, nonpartisan, and ethical civil service.

    21. Finally, it is important to note that changes to the appointment process, even if made through administrative guidelines rather than legislation, should be implemented carefully and consistently to ensure their legitimacy, sustainability, and compliance with both administrative law and democratic principles.