Vision and Policy to Jumpstart the Reconstruction of the State of Israel
The tragedy of October 7th 2023 also included new sparks of hope for that promise called “The State of Israel.” From tragedy and loss, a society and community sought to shake off its latest wounds: polarization and alienation between people, a directionless and deadlocked political system, strained relations between branches of government, economy deficiencies, and the military vulnerability we were not sufficiently aware of.
These sparks of hope must be channeled by the leadership for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Tachlith aims to assist the Country’s leadership in formulating and leading a vision for reconstruction, including a list of policy reforms and structural changes which are to become the cornerstones for the reconstruction of the State.
This is the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative, and these are its main principles.
Introduction: From Vision to Public Policy
The State of Israel is currently facing the greatest crisis since its inception. The events of October 7th, 2023 shattered a fundamental factor in the social contract between a state and its citizens – a failure in the first mission of every state, most certainly of the State of Israel: to defend its citizens’ lives and well-being.
Yet, the tragedy’s underlying causes and the unsatisfactory response of various governmental systems in the days that followed, were the product of ailments that were already present on October 6th: tears in the fabric of our society, in the political system, in the public sector, in the regime and constitutional infrastructure, in the economy, and yes — even in national security. If we do not address these problems, they will continue to harm us and threaten our security, even more intensely, on the day after.
Upon the establishment of the Tachlith Institute, we made it our mission to “take an active part in the intellectual and practical craft of founding a model society, fortifying the State of Israel’s survival and security, and reinforcing its Jewish and democratic character.” This meaning of this mission statement is to offer the State of Israel, through its elected officials, a vision and compass to help the leadership steer the ship towards national rehabilitation and reconstruction,* as well as proposing political solutions that would constitute the cornerstones of the reconstruction process. This is the “Ahad Ha’am Initiative”.
We have taken the ambitious task of crafting comprehensive political and legislative solutions and recommendations required to fulfill this vision. “It takes a village” for a real, deep-reaching reconstruction effort which goes beyond political slogans or election propaganda. It will require a consistent national effort, led by a stable leadership and with participation by a wide range of political actors and civil society organizations.
The “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative’s objective is to present a compass suitable for a reconciliation leadership committed to a national reconstruction process, and to describe the public policy areas where Tachlith can offer real added value, up to the level of legislative and policy solutions.
B. The Vision for Reconstruction: The “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative
Reconstruction is not the same as founding a State “from scratch”. The State already exists; it has an ethos, government and social institutions stand, and civil society is alive and kicking, albeit divided and conflict-ridden. The first stage in defining the reconstruction process is understanding what we lost along the way.
B.1 What Did We Lose on the Way to October 7th?
For quite some time, the State of Israel has been undergoing a process of the erosion of social cohesion, reflected by steadily declining faith in institutions, and a civil society that suffers from polarization and growing alienation between its different parts. The Israeli public is suspicious of whoever is different, remains insular within identity-based political and sociological camps, and breaks off into units that not only disagree about values, but simply view reality differently. In this reality, the sense of partnership and the ability to collectively sustain a national project that must withstand significant external challenges, are lost.
Social polarization spread like a stubborn virus, attacking the political system and creating a leadership with a partisan, sectorial orientation, and a Knesset that is divided, conflict-ridden, and paralyzed, in which the camps representing the Israeli majority refused, or were unable, to work together.
Under these circumstances, each camp turned to its most extreme margins. Populist trends entered the heart of the political system through the front door. The result: a fragile coalition, poorly functioning governments, and five consecutive elections which ended with the rise of a government that relies and depends on populist forces from the margins of the political spectrum. The political crisis has changed the face of the Knesset and fed back into escalating the social crisis.
In addition, marginalized, identity-based politics began to generate hostility and unwillingness to cooperate with the bureaucratic systems which constitute the government’s operational arm. The government crisis caused grave harm to the public sector (which was already replete with structural problems and barriers) and created aftershocks in various systems — health, education, welfare, the economy and more. The disfunction of government in Israel began showing its signs and adversely impacting the entire economy.
The unstable political system served as an incentive for forces within it, encouraged by and relying on the margins, to challenge the rules of the game in Israel’s governmental and constitutional system, thus exposing the system’s structural weaknesses (the likes of which are not to be found it any advanced democracy) to all. The crisis that erupted following the attempt to pass, in one fell swoop, a judicial reform plan that ambitiously attempted to upend the very foundations of Israel’s constitutional system, further entrenched the social and political crises and confronted Israel’s citizens with the cost of a system of government that operates with no agreed “rules of the game” and no barriers that can protect it from populist changes.
Concerns about deep, far-reaching changes in the constitutional foundations of the system of government, and the public battle ignited by the judicial reform plan, led to societal discord and hit the economy hard. The economy’s driving forces slowed, the Shekel was devalued, credit rating agencies issued warnings, and investors withdrew. All this happened against the backdrop of an economy already suffering from low productivity, high cost of living, and one of the widest socio-economic gaps in the West.
It is too early to determine whether the cumulative blow to all components of the nation’s resilience — social, political, governmental, and economic — were directly linked to the failures of October 7th. Yet there is no doubt that the loss of Israeli power made us more vulnerable to grave security threats. The tragic consequences of October 7th will stay with us far into the history of Israel and Zionism. Even worse, the tragedy left us with institutions and systems that are not made to withstand the spectrum of challenges Israeli society faces. To rehabilitate the State, one must start with its damaged foundations.
Diagram 1. Foundations of the Israeli Crisis on the Eve of October 7th
Political and Governmental Crisis | Blow to Economic Fortitude | |||
Declining Social Cohesion | Crisis in the political system, weakened governance and seeking solutions in the margins A decline in the public sector’s capabilities and in public services | Constitutional Crisis | The constitutional crisis harms economic fortitude, generates uncertainty and hurts the Shekel and economic growth This is in tandem with an economy suffering from a high cost of living, large socio-economic gaps, and low productivity | Loss of Security |
Social polarization and a decline in faith in government institutions Alienation and hostility between tribes in society Loss of solidarity and shared concept of reality | Exposing the weaknesses of the constitutional and governmental infrastructure Crumbling of the commitment to rules of the game based on values of democracy and the rule of law | Cumulation of chain of factors that weakens personal and national security, leaving Israel’s citizens vulnerable to tragedy, which was finally realized |
B2. Reconstruction Starts from the Foundations
The “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative’s overarching idea is that reconstruction of the State of Israel on the day after the war must start with rehabilitating the foundations, which we call the “Central Guiding Factors”: the social fabric, the constitutional infrastructure, governmental systems, the economy, and security.
Diagram 2 The Central Guiding Factors of Israeli Society on the Day After October 7th
Security | Fortifying national security and personal safety |
The Government and public service | An executive branch that works for the citizen and is subject to law |
Constitutional and governmental infrastructure | Institutionalizing the “rules of the game” for the relations between the branches of government, promoting the rights of individuals and communities |
Social fabric | Ending the “tribal wars” |
The economic factor | Reduce the cost of living, gaps between urban and nonurban areas, enhancing infrastructure, and increasing productivity |
Each of the Central Guiding Factors is a world in and of itself, and each factor’s individual rehabilitation could include addressing a long list of public policy issues — which would take a long time. Yet each of the factors has an Archimedean point — central policy areas, where creating positive change could generate a substantial impact and set rehabilitation into long-term motion.
The “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative’s philosophy is that, in the first working stages, the focus should be on the Archimedean point of each of the Central Guiding Factors, breaking them down into a list of policy changes and legislative and regulatory amendments in various areas.
A State of Israel with strong foundations goes back to having:
State | Connection and continuity between Jewish roots and being a modern liberal democracy |
All citizens feel protected and secure in their homes, communities, and country | |
Shared responsibility, solidarity, and a shared narrative that all create a fate shared by choice | |
A sound constitutional infrastructure and a government committed to the values of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which acts for the common good and accepts the supremacy of the rule of law | |
Every citizen has an equal opportunity to fulfill his or her potential and live in economic prosperity, as accepted in leading countries in the world |
That is the vision of the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative.
This document is intended to present the parts of the reconstruction process which Tachlith addresses at present and in the near future. As stated, we do not purport to offer a full map of political solutions to realize the Initiative. Instead, we invest our resources in places where we have the ability to contribute to the national effort; work together with partners from academic institutions and civil society in other areas; and leave part of the efforts to others.
Before we dive into each topic, we will devote the next few lines to the Institute’s unique research philosophy and explain how our policy solutions are developed.
C. How Do We Develop Policy? Research Philosophy
As part of the philosophy of focusing on Archimedean points, the policy areas we address in the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative concern complex aspects of the Israeli reality. These aspects entail tensions between different parts of the population and between conflicting world views, which must coexist to allow a healthy society to live together.
Israeli history proves it is difficult to create a stable, sustainable policy in these places. For example, the Knesset has been trying to pass Basic Law: Legislation since 1970, without success. The same is true of the issue of the size and structure of the Government, which has been a matter of continuous public dispute and has undergone several legislative amendments over the years, but has always been swayed by political pressure more than anything else.
Reform in the civil service has also remained unimplemented and has met obstacles under right-wing and left-wing governments alike. And, as is well known, matters of religion and state have also remained unsolved and have meandered between the street and the Supreme Court, without any ability to advance a stable policy in the political system.
The more sectarian Israeli society becomes, and the more divided and polarized the political system becomes, the greater the number of policy solutions that have, and will, encounter difficulties.
Upon its establishment, Tachlith Institute set out to counter this trend and formulate policy solutions that can succeed in generating systemic stability, solving fundamental problems that until now have met with unsurmountable barriers, and to attain support, or at least understanding, across camps.
For this purpose, the Institute adopted a unique operating philosophy. It relies on five core principles which guide the Institute’s research activity and characterize the policy solutions we will present to realize the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative.
Shared moral compass — The values of Israel’s Declaration of Independence are the basis for Israeli society’s shared existence and serve as a compass for the Institute’s activities. Beside the moral core, as expressed in the spirit of the Declaration and the roots of the Zionist enterprise, our research is independent of narrow ideological objectives which are not part of the national Israeli ethos, and as such is not determined by them.
Israeli statehood (Mamlachtiut) — Israel is a multicultural society and the groups within it have diverse moral preferences and differing needs. Public policy cannot be sustainable if it serves the objectives of a single group while ignoring or trampling the needs of another. This means that the Institute generates policy after considering the needs of all sectors, and not just one in particular. Sometimes, policy suggestions contain internal compromises whose function is to generate a broad support base (all without compromising on the fundamental principles for a Jewish and democratic state in the spirit of the values of the Declaration of Independence).
The policy we propose almost never meets all the wishes of any particular sector. However, in the long run, the solutions we propose will be achievable and will be able to stand the test of time. This is an essential condition for any successful public policy.
Applicability – The Institute acts in a variety of ways to guarantee the policy solutions it presents are applicable both publicly and politically, and do not remain “on the shelf” as utopian policy that cannot be achieved.
Content that is based on research and experience on the ground – Each central project’s “desk” includes researchers from the Institute as well as research fellows from academia in Israel and the world, who come from different fields and areas of expertise. People with practical experience on the ground are also integrated in the work, such that the combination and diversity of researchers helps us decipher complex and stubborn problems, using a fresh, creative, and interdisciplinary research approach.
For example, the complex and loaded issue of the judicial selection system in Israel was discussed at the Institute by research teams that combined legal advisors from the public sector’s upper echelons, and researchers from the areas of governance and political science, comparative constitutional law, institutional design, game theory (expertise in selection committees), and organizational psychology.
Diversity – In every policy area that involves moral issues and questions about the distribution of resource pie, the work is supported by heterogeneous research and advisory teams. It is important to note that we are not a neutral party; our objective is not to create a compromise or average between the different voices, and not everyone involved in the work serves as a “veto player”. This working method’s significance is that during the research we are already able to map out the various public approaches and to precisely depict Israeli society. Such and approach impacts both the content of the solutions proposed, as well as the ability to implement them.
The Institute’s research products are modular, and they are determined according to needs on the ground and the timeframes in which the political system operates. A typical work process includes three work stages, integrated with decisionmakers and the ecosystem of the civil society community.
In Stage A, a research team is formulated which includes researchers from the Institute, fellows, and external advisors. An initial opinion is drafted (a “tachles” (Yiddish for “to the point, purposeful”) document) which maps out the topic and identifies the challenges and principles for crafting a solution.
In Stage B, a comprehensive policy paper is formulated, which diagnoses the problem, discusses the social objectives and the policy alternatives to achieve them, and drafts concrete policy recommendations. This stage includes research using various methodologies, familiarity with reality on the ground, and holding roundtables and meetings with decisionmakers.
In Stage C, end products are produced: legislative bills (including for basic laws), draft resolutions, regulatory bills etc. In appropriate cases, this stage is conducted in partnership with decisionmakers, and following a mapping of the political field and seeking areas of agreement that can guarantee political applicability.
D. The Cornerstones: Our Policy Solutions
In the lines below, we will outline the policy areas we are presently working on to formulate the cornerstones of the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative. The policy areas selected reflect the Institute’s existing areas of expertise, adjusted to the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative’s Archimedean points, and places where we feel we can make a significant contribution. Naturally, various policy solutions are in different stages of work and readiness, and some reflect research activities that commenced before October 7. Our work’s modularity makes it possible to respond to changes in the political reality and national priorities, by concentrating efforts on particular areas among those we research, as well as new fields.
D.1. Governance and Law
1. Basic Law: Legislation
Any healthy democratic society needs stable rules of the game for governance, based on broad social consensus. The rules of the game determine the powers of the branches of government (central and local), regulate the relations between them, and enable a collective decision-making system based on compromise and seeking areas of consensus, instead of seeking refuge in the margins or trying to take advantage of the rules’ fragility for aggressive opportunism. At present, Israel has a chaotic constitutional state: in the absence of a full constitution, each of the branches of power suffers from ambiguity with respect to its powers, while at the same time possessing unconventional weapons that enable it to set its own boundaries of power. The main culprit in this constitutional chaos is the absence of the Basic Law: Legislation – the chapter in Israel’s developing constitution which is supposed to regulate the power to legislate laws and basic laws, judicial review of legislation, and the boundaries of each branch of government’s powers. In the past few years, we have witnessed an increasing escalation in the tense relations between the branches of government as well as in political instability, and the aftershocks are well known. We at Tachlith Institute believe that the main reason for this is because Basic Law: Legislation has not been enacted. It is the reason — and the solution. In the present reality, there is a permanent constitutional loophole which provides elected officials incentives to initiate bills for far-reaching constitutional changes, supported by a narrow political majority, and for political purposes. The past year’s crisis clearly demonstrated the importance of regulating this chapter in Israel’s constitutional enterprise.
In the past year, the Institute led a series of research activities in this area, as well as dialogue with figures from the entire political spectrum (except extremist parties). This process reached its pinnacle in the Institute’s intensive work serving as the exclusive professional advisor to the President on this matter, within discussions on a compromise on the judicial reform plan. For a long period, we felt the pulse and examined the boundaries of consensus between figures in the current coalition and the main opposition parties (including the United Arab List). We exchanged drafts and impressions with experts on behalf of these figures. Even before this, the Institute held consultations with leading thinkers across the political spectrum, among them former Chief Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and former Minister of Justice Daniel Friedmann.
Alongside the dialogue with stakeholders, the Institute conducted a series of auxiliary studies, including public opinion studies, an analysis of changes in Israel’s basic laws over time, and an examination of legislative bills from the past. All these helped us formulate a research picture that can teach both about the need for, and the ways to compose, a legislative plan that can garner broad political and public support, and lead to the laying of sound constitutional foundations to advance Israel’s constitutional enterprise.
In light of all the above, we formulated a legislative bill that has the power to win broad consensus across political camps. The bill includes sophisticated mechanisms to enact and amend basic laws, to regulate the supreme normative status of basic laws, and to regulate judicial review of legislation by setting a threshold requirement for an expanded judicial panel, together with a required two-thirds majority within the panel, for judicial intervention in legislation.
2. Reforms in the Knesset: The “Tachles Knesset” Project
Israel’s system of government accords a place of seniority to the Knesset — the successor of the State’s Constituent Assembly (Ha’asefa Ha’mechonenet) — which has served as its house of representatives and legislative branch since 1949. The Knesset represents the people, the true sovereign in Israeli democracy, and Knesset debates are supposed to reflect the Israeli public’s diverse opinions and stances. The platform of the Knesset is the melting pot for ideas and proposals raised for the benefit of advancing public policy and molding the State’s path and image. Therefore, it is the most highly distilled expression of the State as the people’s state — a democracy. Among the three branches of government in our system, the Knesset has been granted the highest powers: It establishes the Government and can force its resignation. It sets the norms that direct our lives, including the most fundamental norms set in the basic laws. Members of Knesset are granted a special status — only the public elects them, and only the public can dismiss them (except under extremely exceptional circumstances).
Today, the Knesset is a far cry from what the State’s founding generation had hoped. A series of governmental, political, and cultural developments over the years have turned the Knesset into a weak and restricted entity, and have created an ever-growing rift between the public and its elected officials. The balance of powers between the Knesset and the Government has been reversed, such that instead of the Government needing to maintain the Knesset’s trust to continue to function, the Knesset has become dependent on the Government, which controls it by enforcing coalition discipline. The system for budget and budget supervision, one of the legislature’s most important powers, is complex and full of holes, enabling the Government to shirk accountability to the Knesset for its expenses — and enabling the Members of Knesset to shirk their accountability to the public.
The independence of Members of Knesset, which is critical for them to faithfully represent and serve the public, has been trampled by arrangements such as the “Norwegian Law” and the elimination of democratic mechanisms within most parties. Important moral and political decisions stopped being adopted in the Plenary long ago — they have migrated to the desk of the Government or the courtrooms of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the culture of Knesset debates has also become a mirror image of a society that is tribal, polarized, and raging. Basic mechanisms and customs for parliamentary debate, such as the Ethics Committee and guaranteeing suitable opposition representation in committees, have become pawns in battles between political blocks that are no longer able to work together ceremoniously.
These signs are making a strong mark on the level of public trust in the Knesset, which has dropped steadily in recent years. As of 2022, the Knesset is ranked last among the branches of government, with a public trust rating of approximately just 22%. The only entity in Israel that garners a lower level of public trust is the political parties, the autonomous units which compose the Knesset, which have an approximately 12% public trust rating. The crisis between the Knesset and the public joins increasing tension and lack of trust between the branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial.
A confluence of these and other factors has led the legislature’s place within Israel’s governmental fabric to decline continuously, and the Knesset has trouble fulfilling its function in a “tachles”, purposeful manner.
In the project “When the Heads of the People Assembled[1] – Making the Knesset ‘Tachles’”, Tachlith Institute aims to propose a comprehensive reform to rehabilitate the Knesset’s status and provide it the tools it needs to serve the public in Israel, with the objective of regaining its trust. Our goal is not just to think about what went wrong along the way to return things to the way they were – because the State of Israel and the Israeli public are very different than they were in the period when the Knesset was founded and its institutions and working procedures were set. Therefore, the public’s expectations of the Knesset also need to be updated. In other words, we must rewrite the contract between the Knesset and the Israeli public.
The Project aims to provide a response to the various challenges that curtail the Knesset’s ability to fulfill its democratic role and public status. It includes a number of proposed reforms, some readily available and some in various working stages. The following are selected examples:
- Reform of Parliamentary Oversight
Despite the Knesset’s seniority, and the fact that it is the people’s most characteristic representative, in practice public interest in political questions revolves mostly around the Government. For years, there has been a process of undermining the balance of power and the distribution of roles between the political branches, which impairs their ability to function. Within the erosion of the Knesset’s functions stemming from this process, the blow to the Knesset’s ability to oversee the Government is conspicuous. Despite the critical need for oversight, and even though the problem’s scale and severity are known to all, in Israel very little research has been devoted to this question. Within the research that has been conducted, insufficient attention has been given to examining the question “what is effective oversight”, and to attempts to identify precisely and wisely how best to execute it. At times, it seems like the more parliamentary oversight has “teeth”, and the more it “restrains” the Government, the more Israeli democracy should improve. Yet that is far from the case: Purposeful, “tachles” oversight is not measured by its ability to restrain the Government or to serve as a counterforce to it, but rather by its ability to help improve public policy through a process of public debate, bringing information from the public to the forefront, improving political accountability to the public, and reinforcing the connection between decisionmakers and the public at large.
The proposed reform includes a series of legislative and regulatory amendments to reinforce the Knesset’s oversight abilities. Among these number the establishment of a committee for parliamentary oversight of the Government, as practiced by many democratic states; adopting innovative oversight mechanisms whose effectiveness has been proven in states such as the UK, France, and Germany; eliminating oversight mechanisms that are cumbersome and anachronistic; advance planning of parliamentary oversight and setting targets and yardsticks to measure implementation; use of suitable auxiliary tools to maximize oversight abilities; an information reform intended to help Members of Knesset overcome the principal-agent problem; and more.
- Reform of the Knesset’s Size
The Knesset suffers from many problems, some chronic: the scope of private legislation is highly disproportionate and demands resources from all relevant parties, which are almost always wasted; the craft of parliamentary oversight, one of the foundations of any functional democratic system, is executed sparsely and incompletely, and the Knesset is unable to oversee the Government effectively; a massive scope of tasks and committee participation is demanded from Members of Knesset, and they cannot fully meet these demands; the Knesset is organized in a way that does not allow it to be an efficient and effective institution. It is no wonder that public trust in the Knesset is at an all-time low.
Comparative research shows that while in most states in the world, and certainly democratic ones, from time to time adjustments are made to conform the parliament’s size to the size of the population and its changing needs. In Israel, this has never been done. In fact, the number — 120 Members of Knesset — which represented Israel at its inception in 1949, continues to represent the nearly ten million citizens of Israel in 2023, with all the national challenges and tasks that entails. The representation ratio in Israel is ranked among the lowest in the democratic world compared to states with similar characteristics.
The reform of the Knesset’s size examines the question of the need and applicability of a change in the Knesset’s structure and increasing the number of members, together with parallel reforms that could be implemented to support this step.
- Reform of Mechanisms for Public Involvement in the Work of the Knesset
The Israeli public has become accustomed to thinking about the connection between voters and elected officials through colorful news stories and punchlines that from time to time depict the unique ways Members of Knesset use the budget allotted for “ties with voters”. Yet in reality, the public’s ability to convey critical messages and information to Members of Knesset is an essential component in any healthy democracy. The connection between the public and its elected officials, and public influence on legislation, can make great strides in the era of advanced communication technology, but for this to happen there is a need to reinvigorate legislative processes and create the suitable platforms.
The “Knesset IL” reform’s fundamental approach is a broad understanding of public participation, the kind that views citizenship as occurring not just in the ballot box, but also in the citizen’s ability to raise various matters with the powers above and to take part (even if indirectly and modestly) in motivating, changing, molding, or bettering the government’s actions. Similar reforms have been implemented throughout the democratic world. At the reform’s core is the establishment of an advanced technological portal for public participation in legislation, which would be implemented in legislative processes as an auxiliary tool for Members of Knesset and committees. This portal would allow Members of Knesset and committee staff to receive relevant information about legislative bills from the public. The public would be able to comment and help enlighten about issues that the legislators, and the professionals that support them in the legislative process, might not notice. The public would also be able to point out the possible implications of the proposed arrangements and demonstrate for Members of Knesset the meanings of the choices they make. However, the power to legislate would remain in the hands of Members of Knesset, and in their hands only.
Establishment of an online mechanism to involve the public in the legislative process would enhance Israeli democracy and the public’s ability to influence the Knesset’s work. It would guarantee all legislation has been reinforced through a greater number of public circuits and filters, which should make it better. It would harness technology, instead of lagging behind it, and would place the Knesset at the heart of public dialogue. It would also increase public trust in the Knesset and accord greater legitimacy to the legislative process and the laws that result therefrom. It would contribute to allaying the representation crisis many citizens experience with great intensity — and would constitute a stage in reinstating the Knesset to its natural place: as a beacon to the people.
3. Amending the Reasonableness Law
In July 2023, Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary passed in the Knesset. This amendment removed the courts’ authority to adjudicate the reasonableness of decisions by elected officials, including decisions about appointments or decisions to refrain from exercising authority. This amendment was enacted as part of the 37th Government’s judicial reform plan, and as such, could be characterized as a clumsy solution, which elicited opposition from almost every professional, to the Reasonableness Standard question. As of the writing of these lines, the amendment’s constitutionality is pending in the Supreme Court and its future is unclear. However, whether the Court rules it unconstitutional, or it survives judicial review, the Reasonableness Standard’s status clearly must be regulated professionally based on broad consensus. Over the past two decades, the Reasonableness Standard has become the main tool for judicial review of the Government and public administration, and its implementation has caused problems in the relationship between the executive and judicial branches.
Tachlith Institute was involved in several rounds of negotiations, before and after the legislation, to reach an arrangement by consensus on the Reasonableness Standard, the last of which was in advanced discussions between the sides immediately before October 7. During debates on the Standard at the President’s Residence, the Institute conducted empirical research which examined the scope of intervention based on the Reasonableness Standard, in appointments approved by the Government.
The Institute proposes a framework for canceling Amendment No. 3 and replacing it with an arrangement within Basic Law: The Government, for structuring the Reasonableness Standard’s role in administrative law. The framework is based on restraining judicial review on the level of discretion with respect to administrative decisions adopted by the Government, combined with a more stringent Reasonableness Test based on a standard titled “Reasonableness as Refutation” with respect to decisions by elected officials. Oversight of civil service appointments, except ministers and ending their terms, would remain under the present Reasonableness Standard.
4. Judicial Selection Method
The Judicial Selection Committee has operated in its current format since 1953 and is responsible for selecting candidates to serve as judges in all instances. The Committee is currently comprised of nine members, appointed by four different entities: the Minister of Justice and another government minister; two Members of Knesset (it is customary for one to come from the opposition parties, but this is not required by law); the Chief Supreme Court Justice and two additional serving Supreme Court Justices; and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association, selected by the Bar Association’s National Assembly. The Committee’s discussions are not open to the public and protocols of the discissions are not made public. The Assembly selects candidates by majority vote (five out of nine), except the Supreme Court, which requires a supermajority of seven out of nine.
In recent years the Supreme Court has suffered from a decline and polarization in public trust and a perception that it does not properly reflect the diverse mosaic of Israeli society. Based on these and other arguments, the coalition in the 25th Knesset made attempts to initiate a radical change in the judicial selection method, which in turn instigated strong public opposition, which has stalled these attempts for the time being.
Within its role as advisor to the President’s Residence within negotiations on the judicial reform plan, Tachlith Institute has been involved in research activities and discussions with the various sides on the matter. Our stance is that the judicial selection method in practice in Israel is worthy and generally leads to the selection of professional, independent, non-partisan judges. However, two worrisome trends cannot be ignored: first, broad sectors in Israel feel that their positions and identities are alien to the courts, and this minimizes their trust in them; and second, attempts to change the system have exposed a plethora of loopholes in the existing method, which could be manipulated by future populistic governments to politicize the court, and hold it “captive” to representatives of the majority.
Tachlith Institute proposes a series of specific amendments to the judicial selection mechanisms which would reinforce public trust in the judicial branch and close the loopholes that expose the judicial branch to government takeover.
Our proposal, which relies on a series of studies in the fields of constitutional and comparative law, constitutional and institutional design, and game theory, includes:
- Changes in the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee: Anchoring opposition representation in the Committee and integrating sophisticated selection mechanisms for the attorneys representing the Bar Association, to guarantee diversity and independent thinking.
- Changes in the selection method: Changes in the mechanism for selection of judges and presidents of instances, intended to protect all levels of the judicial branch from “takeovers” by the executive branch, and to guarantee an appropriate balance between the Selection Committee’s professional and political components.
- Regulating the format for public hearings: In 2022, the Minister of Justice and the Chief Supreme Court Justice agreed to hold public hearings for Supreme Court candidates. Until today, procedures for these hearings have yet to be set. Tachlith Institute formulated a policy paper containing recommendations to anchor a procedure for conducting hearings, to be based on five principles: transparency and publicness, professionalism, pertinency, equality, and due process. The operational principles we propose would guarantee that the process is pure, pertinent, and non-partisan.
5. The “Thin Constitution” Project (in Partnership with the Jewish People Policy Institute)
At the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel, the signatories undertook to institute a constitution for the young state no later than October 1948. As we know, despite the target date set, Israel’s constitution was never completed. Years after the Declaration of Independence, a debate would arise among Israel’s greatest jurists on the question of whether the aspiration to be a constitutional democracy describes reality or remains an unrealized vision of the founding fathers. Yet there is no debate that, according to the Harari compromise adopted by the Knesset in 1950, the constitution continues to be written, chapter by chapter, through the basic laws. Over the years, the Knesset has enacted basic laws on different topics such as human rights, the military, the status of Jerusalem, state lands, and more. Basic laws have also been enacted with respect to the main branches of government — Knesset, Government, and judicial branch — yet these laws never won full constitutional status, including clear and agreed supremacy over conflicting legislation, inflexibility, and protection against frequent changes by the Knesset. As a result, today Israel’s constitution is disabled, weak, and vulnerable. We all had the privilege of understanding the cost of this in 2023, upon publication of the 37th Government’s judicial reform plan.
Over the years, a number of attempts have been made in Israel to establish a constitution, yet they failed due to difficulties bringing various groups to consensus on articles on the identity of the State, its fundamental values, and a bill of rights to be included in the constitution. The idea behind the “Thin Constitution” project is to agree first on the main skeleton of the constitution, including the structure and powers of the branches of government. This stems from an understanding that agreement on the constitution’s structural component would contribute substantially to the stability of Israel’s democratic regime, and that after adoption of the (thin) constitution, the institutional conditions would improve to discuss and agree on the constitution’s remaining components.
The “thin” constitution would include anchoring the identity of the government branches, their structure, roles, and the relations between them, and would detail their powers, in order to anchor the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.
The project is administered under the auspices of the Jewish People Policy Institute, led by Prof. Yedidia Stern, and headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Elyakim Rubinstein. Tachlith Institute is a partner in the project — both within the Managing Committee and the senior research team.
6. Enhancing Trust in the Judicial System
In a democratic regime, public faith in government authorities is a critical condition for stability and effective operation. All of Israel’s government authorities suffer from a continuous decline in public trust in them and their activity. Furthermore, it seems that the question of the judicial branch’s status, and public trust therein, are the source of deep public debate. As a result, arguments regarding a loss of trust in the judicial system were at the core of the justifications which served the aggressive reform steps advanced by the 37th Government with respect to the judicial system.
No one can debate the centrality and importance of trust in the judicial system, yet numerous polls bear witness that in recent decades there has been a steep drop in the judicial system’s public status, and trends towards polarization have primarily gained strength: One political camp’s level of trust is sky-high, while the other camp does not view the court as a worthy institution. In addition, there is a heated dispute among parts of the Israeli public about the reasons that led to the undermining of trust and decline in the court’s status.
One side places blame on excessive intervention by Israeli courts in general, and the High Court of Justice in particular, in topics under public debate, which belong to the political sphere. On the other end, the argument is that the blow to trust in the courts results from intentional acts by political figures to weaken it, within steps to curtail the rule of law and judicial review of the Government.
Modern studies on trust in public institutions teach us that although there is truth in both arguments, public trust is also influenced by many other aspects of the institution’s conduct towards the public. That is to say, even before resorting to reforms or material changes in the court’s role, much can be done to increase trust. Research on this topic is led by Adv. Eyal Yinon, former Knesset legal advisor, and Adv. Udit Corinaldi-Sirkis, former legal advisor to the President of the State of Israel. Upon completion of the research, policy recommendations will be presented to restore public trust in courts, across camps and without partisan affiliation — a resource every healthy democratic society needs.
7. The Status and Independence of the Attorney General
Until today, the legal status of the Attorney General’s legal opinions has never been regulated in written law. According to the law in practice, which formed over the years in Supreme Court caselaw and in reports by professional committees that dealt with the topic, “the Attorney General is the authorized interpreter of the law for all arms of the executive branch, and the Attorney General’s legal opinion is binding for them, and reflects the existing law for them, as long as no authorized court decides otherwise.” (HCJ 158/21 Physicians for Human Rights v. Minister of Internal Security, para. 5 of Justice Mazuz’s opinion (accessed on the site Nevo, January 31, 2021)). As a result, the Attorney General also serves as the exclusive representative of the Government’s position in judicial proceedings. Representatives on behalf of the Attorney General present in court the Government’s position, or the position decided by the Attorney General.
This subject was also at the core of the 37th Government’s judicial reform plan, under which legislative bills were initiated to radically change all aspects of the Attorney General’s status. These were harmful bills that would have curtailed the Government’s working capacity and the preservation of the rule of law. Despite this, at their core is an issue that should be considered seriously, the balance between law and order and effective government. This balance should be achieved on a professional and pertinent basis.
Tachlith Institute proposes a proportional research-based reform, which would adopt the shared responsibility model. Our proposal includes specific changes in the government legal advisory system, and in the relations between ranking government officials who execute decisions and the gatekeepers, which would increase the efficiency of government work, promote diversity among legal practitioners in the civil service, and guarantee the supremacy of the rule of law.
Among the model’s proposed changes:
- Creating regulated exceptions to the representation model: In exceptional cases where the Government believes the Attorney General’s position does not represent the law, and where there is no “clear and apparent illegality” (as stated in the Shamgar Report), the Government would be able to seek private representation, despite the Attorney General’s stance, according to a Government resolution adopted by a majority of its members.
- The appointment of legal advisors to government ministries would be conducted as a professional search committee process with a tender, subject to threshold conditions and professional tests. The terms of the tender would be determined subject to the work of a professional taskforce, to be conducted to increase the pool of candidates and improve the quality of legal services.
- Without derogating from the provisions of law regarding the removal of a civil servant from a position, ministers would be able to initiate removal of their ministry’s legal advisor, provided there are continuous and material differences of opinion which cannot be bridged and prevent effective cooperation. This would be subject to approval by a committee comprised of the Attorney General, the ministry’s Director General, and a public representative who meets the terms of eligibility under Section 10 of the Labor Court Law 5729-1969, to be appointed by the Minister of Justice with the consent of the Advisory Committee, according to Section 16A of the Law.
- Budgetary regulation would be instituted for the terms for government ministry legal advisors leaving their positions, according to government resolution 631 dated July 26, 2009.
8. The Structure and Size of the Government
The State of Israel leads OECD-Member States in government size. This is not a figure to be proud of, but rather a testimony to wasted resources, unneeded government ministries, and using minister and deputy minister positions as political awards instead of as a tool to increase the efficiency of services to citizens. Thus, for example, Israel’s first government numbered 18 ministries served by 12 ministers, while in the current Government the number has already swelled to 36 ministries. On the day it was sworn in, 38 ministers served in the Government (a number that rose when the National Unity party entered the Government following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, currently standing at 42 ministers). The high government turnover rate, as well as the increase in the number of ministers serving, are of course just symptoms of fundamental problems characteristic of Israel’s executive branch.
One of the main causes of this problem stems from how easy it is to make changes. Section 31 of Basic Law: The Government grants the Government the legal authority to establish government ministries and determine their areas of responsibility and the responsibilities of the ministers that serve them. This authority is exercised every time there is a political need when a new government is formed, often at the expense of the relevant needs of public administration. The Government’s lack of stability also impacts relations between local and national governments, and the division of power between them has also become a function of relevant political needs.
Finally, even when the division of responsibility between government functions is clear and undisputed, it seems that time and again different local and national government units do not know how to work together. This fact also curtails the executive branch’s ability to provide services to the State’s citizens, and in a broader sense, to realize complex national missions.
The battle Israel has been confronting since October 7 has revealed the heavy price the civil service pays for this instability. For weeks on end, many government ministries were paralyzed, unable to grasp the moment’s significance. Thus, for example, local authorities from north to south report that systems were down due to a lack of government support, businesses hurt by the war are drowning in bureaucracy, and many citizens — too many — find their physical and emotional needs unmet. These failures serve as a strong testimony that, if before there was a need to work to remedy the executive branch’s shortcomings, this need has become urgent and can no longer be delayed.
Tachlith Institute has made it a goal to examine the structure of the executive authority, its ministries, and their areas of responsibility. The aim is to provide a comprehensive solution to the issue of the Government’s structure and size and to create a legal framework that can guarantee stability, so needed to establish an efficient and effective government. Our proposal will include an amendment to Basic Law: The Government, regulating the permanent government ministries that operate, recommendations for mergers between ministries, turning ministries into staff units, and recommendations to anchor government working procedures and inter-ministerial work.
9. Amending the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People
The Swords of Iron War proved the depth of the shared fate of all the State’s citizens, Jews and members of other groups alike. This partnership is evident in the mosaic of victims, and in the spirit of volunteerism demonstrated by the people and in the ranks of the IDF and the other security and rescue forces. Against this backdrop, the rift caused by Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People is conspicuous.
The Nation-State Law constitutes a central chapter in the State of Israel’s developing constitution, and it is worthy of inclusion in the State of Israel’s lawbooks. Its aim is to anchor the State’s identity and fundamental values in a basic law. Since its legislation in 2018, instead of unifying the public as it should have, the law left a bloody wound on Israel’s social fabric. The main reason is a feeling among many parts of the public — stemming partially from the narrow majority that passed the law in the Knesset — that the law tips the balance between Jewish and democratic values at the State of Israel’s foundation, while hurting the sense of belonging of minority groups in Israeli society.
Tachlith Institute proposes to amend the Basic Law to heal these deficiencies without adding sections that might not enable broad consensus around the law or might generate additional disputes about the principles of the State’s identity.
Our proposed amendment adds the following components to the law:
- Two subsections in Section 1 of the Basic Law anchoring the fundamental principles: Section 1(b) as follows: “Israel is a Jewish and democratic state,” and Section 1(e) as follows: “In the State of Israel all are equal before the law.”
- A provision stipulating that the Arabic language is a second official language in the State of Israel.
A provision amending Section 7, which deals with Jewish settlement, stipulating at the end of the Section “in the spirit of the fundamental principles in Section 1.”
[1] Deuteronomy 33:5
D.2 Foreign Relations and Security
Israel’s national resilience rests on four central pillars: security, political, economic, and social. All of them were jolted on October 7.
The events of that day were a national tragedy, and although they did not pose an existential threat to the State of Israel, they have far-reaching consequences on its foreign policy and security. On the more immediate level, the attack cut deep into the sense of personal security and violated public trust in the unwritten contract with the IDF and the security forces — their obligation and ability to protect Israel’s citizens wherever they are located in the State. Concurrently, the events of October 7 clearly illustrated the need to institutionalize and update the State of Israel’s national security concept, and to reexamine priorities and conduct vis a vis regional threats, first and foremost Iran and its proxies, as well as the Palestinian arena.
The goal for decisionmakers must be clear: restoring trust and the State of Israel’s citizens’ sense of security against external and internal threats in their everyday lives. To this aim, there is a need to formulate a clear policy to realize the fundamental principles of national security, first and foremost fortifying the State of Israel’s ability to defend itself independently, while preserving and enhancing its special relationship with the United States, reinforcing its strategic positioning as a regional superpower, bolstering its international status and network of international ties, while completing, developing and strengthening normalization with regional states and moderate Muslim states, while at the same time acting to rebuild and enhance citizens’ personal security in the communal, urban, and national spheres.
In the Palestinian arena, the longstanding conflict, and its impact on Israel’s public, on its global standing and its citizens’ security, were always a significant cornerstone of the Israeli story. The events of October 7 were a reminder to decisionmakers in Israel that neglecting this topic has a clear and tangible cost.
Within the national security priorities, the State of Israel — which has relied on a strategy of managing the conflict since 2008, which had a heavy price in the end — must act to promote a diplomatic response, alongside a strong defense policy.
Since 1967, Israel’s political leadership has not formulated a picture for the end of the conflict and a coherent strategy tailored to the Palestinian arena. Nor has Israel ever formulated a national strategy for conduct during the interim phase, until the final picture. The three interests — defense, maintaining a political barrier between Israel and the Palestinians, and achievements in the diplomatic arena — were managed with varying levels of intensity. Since 2009, Israel made do with preserving inertia and maintaining a divided and weakened Palestinian autonomy — the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and Hamas in Gaza.
Subject to the national and international constraints, Tachlith Institute is acting to formulate recommendations for an applicable policy, that responds to three underlying assumptions:
- Israel must engage continuously, intelligently, and effectively in the Palestinian question and its impact on the State. Israel’s sovereignty, national security, international status, and internal resilience are all influenced by this.
- The absence of a national strategy on the question, and attempts to place it aside, bear heavy costs. In particular, they push Israel towards a destructive one-state reality which means the end of the State of Israel as we know it. For this reason, it is imperative to do everything possible to change directions, move away from precariously slipping towards one state, and move closer to the horizon of separation from the Palestinians.
- Israel acts in the Palestinian arena under an array of substantial national and international constraints, which limit the range of diplomatic possibilities available to the Government at any given time. The events of October 7 caused a change in these constraints as well as opportunities which must be taken, and from which a national strategy with clear, applicable goals must be formulated.
Naturally, we cannot delve here into all our activity in this area, but we would be happy to provide details in an in-person dialogue. This document will focus on two central aspects of strategy development which could be part of the public political dialogue.
1. The Gaza Exit Strategy: The Day After
The outbreak of the Swords of Iron War led to the massive collapse of paradigms that had guided the State of Israel’s policy and the security forces’ assessments in recent years. On the strategic, operative, and tactical levels, it was revealed that paradigms about Gaza proved to be failures that cost many human lives. These include, inter alia, the question whether Hamas was deterred, the ability to sustain the organization gaining strength, assessing its intentions, and above all, the concept of dividing the arenas Judea and Samaria and Gaza, and a willingness to strengthen Hamas as a governmental entity, as a way to restrain it.
Days after embarking on the war, the political leadership defined the objective of exercising military force in Gaza as toppling the military and governmental powers of Hamas (as well as other terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Jihad) in Gaza, and bringing back all the hostages.
In order for this achievement to be sustainable (independent of military and political constraints), and in order to take advantage of the window of opportunity that has opened before us to bring a significant change in the regional reality, to Israel’s benefit, a detailed political and operative directive is needed, which defines for the security forces the final status that is desirable for the State of Israel, to maintain military achievements and entrench them to prevent a recurrence of the above threat, as well as new threats. In other words, a Gaza exit strategy is needed — deliberation on the day after the intensive military maneuvering, a multistage and multidimensional vision.
Tachlith Institute is acting to create a suitable framework for this type of analysis, and to assist decisionmakers in Israel and the world in promoting such a reality. The Institute works with the threat scenario proposed by the security forces, while bringing the tensions to the forefront, identifying challenges, and presenting various alternatives for application — first, through a bird’s-eye view of the threat scenario’s components, and afterwards by studying its various components, which will constitute an inherent part of any future picture. The second stage is presenting relevant concrete steps for realization in order to preserve room for political flexibility for decisionmakers. The research activity will be accompanied by providing assistance and support to decisionmakers through the Institute’s capabilities, as a non-governmental body, to hold dialogue with relevant actors and stakeholders.
The Institute’s political recommendations will aim to realize the war’s targets as a supreme objective, based on the three no’s:
- No Hamas as sovereign in Gaza;
- No chaos in Gaza;
- No giving up Israeli security control.
The “Day After” strategy we propose will be comprised of three main components – security (including addressing the need for public order), administering civilian life, and building an infrastructure for a local political administration that does not threaten Israel. With respect to each component, recommendations will be divided into short-term (humanitarian stage), medium-term, and long-term. On the international level, our plan will formulate the terms and incentives suitable for desirable international involvement in Israel — United States leadership and enhancing ties with moderate regional states to build a regional framework.
2. Advancing Normalization in the Middle East: Solving the Palestinian Component
Tachlith Institute’s insight from deep involvement in dialogue with official and unofficial stakeholders in Israel and the world during the past year is that returning to the path of normalization with moderate Arab states will require a satisfactory response to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This objective is also consistent with Israel’s need to prevent slipping into an undesirable one-state reality.
In this framework, the Institute is developing a national policy alternative that includes applicable elements in the areas of territory, security arrangements, settlement, civilian arrangements, connecting the Palestinians with the world through border crossings, and more. These elements are intended to put the wheels of normalization into motion by improving the Palestinian reality on the ground using politically feasible tools that are available. The policy relies on four cornerstones: strengthening Israel’s national security, acting to prevent a one-state reality, keeping the political horizon open for promoting diplomatic negotiations; and a measured increase in Palestinian self-rule, in a manner that does not endanger Israel’s security.
D.3. The Civil Service
The civil service is the State’s primary operative arm. Its sound functioning is essential for the Government’s ability to govern and the citizens’ social well-being. Without the Government’s bureaucratic layer, decision-making processes are weakened considerably, and decisions that are made — can almost never be implemented. For citizens, public service is the display window that provides them government services in various areas of life. In this sense, the civil service is the main barometer that impacts citizens’ level of trust in government institutions. As we saw during the Swords of Iron war, the public service also has an essential role in national states of emergency, and slowness or ineffectiveness on its part could have heavy costs.
For years, Israel’s civil service has suffered from a continuous erosion of the professional and official ethos upon which it was established. Civil service professionals are frequently attacked by elected officials. The critical relationship between civil servant managers and the ministers that supervise them is unhealthy. Political and sectarian considerations have infiltrated deep into the heart of the public service’s activity, dealing a deadly blow to professional service. Even before this, the service was characterized by long and cumbersome bureaucratic processes, gaps between different services, outdated and inflexible employment structures that made it hard to recruit and maintain high-quality human capital, as well as a lack of responsiveness, efficiency, and transparency.
Tachlith Institiute’s “Tachlith Stamp” research program, in partnership with research fellows from academia and led by Adv. Emi Palmor, will propose a comprehensive reform to restore the civil service. Its supreme goal is to cultivate, in Israel, a public sector that is high-quality, efficient, and well-managed, comprised of outstanding, ethical civil servants, who view their position as a public calling, and act professionally and fearlessly to realize the Government’s policy goals for the good of all. The reform includes several pillars, as described below.
3. The Reform: “The Best Go to the Civil Service”
The quality of the civil service is determined first and foremost by the employees who fill its ranks. Over the years, the public service’s ability to identify, develop, and maintain outstanding individuals has declined, dealing a blow to the ethos of excellence which characterized the civil service in the past. Reforms proposed in the past were not adopted or were implemented in a partial or toothless way. In a changing employment market, and in light of the increase in government ministry services, there is a need to adopt a comprehensive reform to revitalize and adjust all aspects of civil service employment at all levels. The comprehensive package we propose would create a new ethos of excellence and a sense of mission in the civil service, and would significantly enhance the public service.
- The entrance gates: making the civil service selection and recruitment process more efficient
Today, the entrance gate to the civil service is usually a public tender. This practice constitutes the main route to civil service appointment and is designed to guarantee an equal process without prejudice. The system was intended to guarantee that the best people would be accepted to fill positions. However, this is a long process that includes many stages, some anachronistic and others which discourage excellent candidates who have good employment prospects in the private sector. This reality hurts the civil service’s ability to recruit quality employees. We propose a structural change in the public sector selection and recruitment system, to create incentives for excellence for all involved and to adjust the civil service to trends in the modern employment market and to the changing needs of the workforce in the civil service. This structural change is intended to increase efficiency, improve, and significantly streamline, selection processes in the civil service, and therefore to enable the recruitment of high-quality human capital.
- Granting managers a toolbox to recruit “talents” and maintain excellent employees
The only formal possibility to attract talents to work in the public service is through a “special contract” or “expert contract”. However, over the years this type of employment has gone from being a tool to recruit quality employees to a tool to improve the employment conditions of existing employees, all without transparency. This has meant that managers in the public service have not had an incentive to help them maintain outstanding employees or recruit “talents”. The reform we propose would grant managers in the public service a toolbox that includes, inter alia, economic incentives, to help attract talents to the civil service, to increase diversity within its ranks and to maintain outstanding employees. In addition, we propose to implement a “fast track” to bring outstanding talents and individuals with essential experience into the civil service, and tracks for dismissal or removal from a position in suitable cases.
- Making the most of human capital in the public service through multi-year planning and adjusting the axis for advancement to the modern economy
Today, there is no systemic vision to make the most of human capital in public service. Advancing from rank to rank depends on the employee’s own individual initiative. In most cases, there is a need to apply, through an internal or inter-ministerial tender, for positions that have become available, with no promise of receiving the position. In practice, this cumbersome model leads outstanding civil servants, who receive advancement offers that are quick and bureaucracy-free from the private sector, to leave. We propose creating structured career paths for candidates and employees with a built-in, transparent axis for promotion, like the IDF’s Ofek model. In tandem, changes in the salary and remuneration structure will be proposed for different ranks, to promote recruitment and advancement of outstanding employees.
- Rebuilding the “Best Go to the Civil Service” ethos
The reform, and all its parts, will be directed to rebuilding the public service’s ethos of excellence. The employment and promotion mechanisms will be directed to providing a sense of mission, excellence, and expectations for excellence from anyone who becomes a civil servant. Civil service cannot compete with the private sector’s upper echelons in terms of salary and compensation, but it can offer candidates added value in revitalizing the ethos of excellence.
4. Strengthening Government Ministries’ Management Powers
Reforms since the beginning of the last decade have been good at identifying the problem of overcentralized management in the Civil Service Commission and the difficulties government ministries and units encountered demonstrating initiative, innovation and pushing forward. Until today, many recommendations have remained unimplemented or have suffered from weak implementation on the ground, a fact that interferes with government ministries’ ability to execute their roles. We propose a series of changes in the legal and institutional infrastructure of the relations between various government units, to enhance the administrative powers of government ministries, subject to effective oversight and a commitment to uphold the rule of law and good character.
- Enhancing flexibility in budget management
Government institutions in Israel are characterized by highly centralized budget management. The Ministry of Finance has a strong influence on the budgets of government ministries, including within the budget frameworks, which it gains through numerous budgetary regulations, and any transfer between these frameworks requires approval by the Budgets Department. This fact creates an administrative bottleneck at the Ministry of Finance and diverts the incentives of decisionmakers who control budget management. The reform we propose, in coordination with veto players in the field, such as nationwide worker organizations and the Budget Department, would aim to grant ministries more flexibility in managing their budgets, as they see fit from a professional standpoint, and subject to transparent criteria and effective controls. The Budgets Department would refrain from micromanaging the budget and would assume a more regulatory role.
- Enhancing flexibility in managing human capital
Like the Ministry of Finance Budget Department’s partnership in managing ministry budgets, the Department is also a partner — together with the Civil Service Commission — in managing the number and ranks of positions. Decisions about authorizing or reducing the number of positions in a ministry are adopted by the Budgets Department, represented by a Ministry employee charged with the matter, without Civil Service Commission involvement. After approval by the ministry and the Budgets Department, the ministry must receive approval for the position from the Civil Service Commission. In addition, changes in existing positions are limited to just 2% of all positions, including promotion through an “individual ranking” for ministry employees. As a result, there is stagnancy in the structure of government ministries and units, along with an inability to adjust them to changing tasks. The reform we propose would create a tailored and efficient mechanism for making changes in a ministry’s array of appointed positions. In addition, the authority to change the ranks of ministry employees to enable employee advancement and remuneration, should be delegated to the ministries.
5. Rehabilitating the Relations Between Elected Officials and Civil Service Management
In recent years, the critical working relationship between the Government’s elected officials and the upper echelons and leadership of government ministries and units has been very bumpy. On one hand, the argument has been raised that there is too much bureaucratic independence, seeking to cancel out policy preferences formulated by the Government. This has been countered by accusations about the politicization of the public service and elected officials bringing in “their own people” who weaken the service and make it a tool in the hands of officials who wish to benefit specific sectors.
This tension should not tip the scales decisively in favor of one side. Proper official conduct and professionalism in the civil service are cornerstones of a sound and effective public administration that serves all. Additionally, the service is the executive arm of policy set primarily by elected officials according to the preferences of the greater public, as reflected in the ballot box. Populistic trends have endeavored to prevent this tension by tipping the scales in favor of one side or the other, but this is a healthy tension which demands complex solutions, to keep it within a balanced framework.
At present, what is clear is that the relationship between elected officials and civil service professionals must be rearranged to create the proper balance between different values. This would enable a professional civil service system with administrative independence, while strengthening public servants’ commitment to promote a government policy that meets the rules of legality and good governance.
- Reexamination of appointment processes and threshold conditions for senior public service positions
In recent years we have witnessed an accelerated politicization of senior public service positions, in which candidates are selected based on personal and political proximity to the supervising minister — not based on suitable skills for the position. This reality is a result of government decisions and legislation that consistently cut away at the threshold conditions of candidates for senior positions. The reform would reevaluate appointment processes for senior positions and would formulate threshold conditions for candidates which would guarantee room for the supervising minister’s choice on one hand, and the appointee’s professionalism on the other hand. In particular, a preliminary examination would be conducted of the requirements and procedures for appointment of the Civil Service Commissioner, which is expected in the coming year.
- Limiting the use of interim appointments as a tool for political control of bureaucracy
In recent years, a new unwanted practice has come into being, of refraining from appointing permanent senior officials in the civil service, and using interim appointees instead, whose appointment conditions are subject to the wishes of the supervising politician, and who have a limited degree of independence. This phenomenon harms the professional status of senior officials and skews the sensitive relations between elected officials and civil service managers. The reform we propose would close this loophole and create statutory yardsticks for the appointment of senior officials, as well as clear provisions for the transfer of positions, to prevent false incentives to use interim appointments for extended periods.
- Formulating a civil service charter which would guarantee a proper balance between public accountability and professional independence
A great share of the bumps in the road in the relationship between elected officials and civil service management stem from the absence of a definition which is clear to all of what constitutes a “healthy” relationship in this context. We propose advancing an ethical service charter which would clarify to senior civil service officials and government ministers what is expected of each side, to allow the public service to focus on what is good for citizens and improving government systems. A healthy working relationship between senior management and ministers would be based on the principle of “marathon of sprints”, which combines realizing short-term goals (which comply with the agenda and the array of political incentives) and long-term targets to be advanced by senior management.
D.4. Israeli Society
Israel is a pluralistic state comprised of several groups from different backgrounds, each of which has different customs, culture, world views, and moral preferences. The State’s ability to act as a coherent political unit which can care for the good of all consists of two complementary components: solidarity between groups (decreasing polarization) and trust in national and local institutions of power. The past few years have challenged social cohesion on these two axes. Thanks to political camps, the introduction of social media, deepening economic gaps, stubborn ethnic and religious tension, as well as other social issues, Israel has become a polarized and alienated society, with no trust in its institutions.
Tachlith Institute’s policy solutions aim to treat the essence of the crisis of trust and polarization, by presenting a series of reforms in areas of society. These would help rebuild society’s resilience and fortify it to lay a suitable infrastructure for shared life in a pluralistic society, including regulating the place of religion and heritage in the public sphere.
In the post-October 7 reality, new opportunities have been created to revitalize the status quo on social issues and generate changes to prepare Israeli society for future challenges in light of demographic changes occurring within it. Additionally, the outcome of the social rifts and divisions created underline the political value of promoting solutions to mend society and reduce polarization, as proposed in this section.
6. Regulating Religion’s Place in the Public Sphere (Under Development)
One of the main sources of dispute and alienation in the Israeli public relates to the impact of a religious presence (primarily Orthodox Jewish) on the public sphere in Israel. Over the years, this issue has led to collisions between different groups in various circumstances: at the Kotel (Western Wall), on public transportation, with respect to opening businesses on Shabbat, in programs to incorporate ultra-Orthodox in academia, and right before October 7 with respect to segregation between men and women in prayer.
For a long time, the forums in which these disputes have been mediated have been the court, in the best-case scenario, and the street, in the worst case, with the resounding absence of the political system. The social outcome of this reality is difficult for all involved: courts are institutions intended for deciding disputes, while democratic societies should strive for compromise and coexistence. Pushing these debates into the courts hurts public trust in the legal system and generates inconsistent decisions. The street is not the place for things to calm down, rather where they erupt.
Tachlith Institute is acting with other civil society partners to change this trend and to bring back unifying politics, to regulate religion’s place in the public sphere.
The Institute will act to develop policy arrangements on a series of topics where religious and liberal values collide in the public sphere, including revitalizing a framework for regulating the place of all denominations of Judaism at the Kotel, prayer in public places, activity in public places on Shabbat and holidays, and providing religious services to the general public. In addition, the Institute is acting to build public institutions based on dialogue to solve future disputes regarding the public space.
The formula we propose to solve these complex social issues relies on a foundation of partnership and recognizing differences between us, and is based on three central principles:
- Solidarity and willingness for partnership in the public sphere — This means ruling out religious coercion while accepting the other’s presence and customs through discussion and dialogue. Regulating the public sphere requires patience, balance, and mutual concessions.
- Human and communal dignity — Recognizing human dignity and every individual’s right to participate equally in the public space is a cornerstone of any arrangement. Alongside this, each community’s right must be recognized to preserve the customs and lifestyles characteristic of its identity.
- Two “cultural loads” — Israel’s public sphere must accept and reflect the fact that Israel’s moral composition includes two “cultural loads” — the load of Jewish heritage and Zionism, and the load of the liberal tradition based on human dignity and freedom. The alienation various groups feel towards the load that is foreign to them, as well as their fears towards it, must be allayed.
7. Civil Participation in the National Enterprise (Under Development)
Israel’s present social-demographic situation reflects a worrisome reality: Two groups that make up steadily increasing shares of the population exist under a social contract that is different from the majority group; do not have equal access to services and opportunities in the areas of education, higher education, and employment; and do not participate equally in the economy and the burden of military service. Within two generations, children belonging to these two groups will together comprise approximately two-thirds of Israel’s children. We are marching in a direction that does not meet the needs of a sustainable modern society, or act for these communities and their survival.
Today, three tools are used concurrently to treat the problem — none of them successfully. One tool is policies and legislation based on carrot and stick. This cannot succeed for isolated, homogeneous populations, much less in a polarized political system, where it is impossible to create a consistent, continuous policy on disputed topics, especially when the policy is not the fruit of compromises and cooperation. The second tool is social projects in the community which seek to create change from down up. These initiatives are welcome, but they usually do not have the power to put in place broad solutions with sufficient weight to generate change in existing trends, which outpace them. A third tool is harnessing the community leadership. This has not had much success thus far either, and in light of the crisis in the Arab and ultra-Orthodox population’s leadership, it is hard to see how it could succeed in the future.
Tachlith Institute is currently examining, together with additional entities in Israel’s civil society, launching a combined initiative, which studies the question of civil participation in the national enterprise. The main focus will seek to generate coordination between the policy tool on one hand, and social-civilian initiatives on the other hand. The goal is to begin a process of building mechanisms, which from the outset would include representation by the leadership of homogeneous communities, such as the ultra-Orthodox and Arab populations — of all stripes — and would seek to generate and implement long-term multi-layered programs, with emphasis on civil areas such as education, employment, growth-based economy, and access to services and welfare.
8. Regulating Social Media Activity in Israel
Over the past few years, unequivocal research testimonies have accumulated indicating that social media services constitute a significant challenge to the very existence of democratic societies and are a major risk factor for individuals. A large part of social media’s social, security, and psychological harm were reflected in the events of October 7 and the days that have passed since. While in large parts of the enlightened world legislation aimed at confronting these dangers has entered into force, in Israel — although it is among the world’s leading states in the distribution of social media services as well as the scope of their use — almost nothing has been done on this matter.
A comprehensive solution to the challenges of social media must start with a precise diagnosis of the problems we wish to solve. Previous legislative bills and policy proposals discussed in Israel suffered from an overly narrow view of the challenge. They attempted to provide a focused response to problems such as the absence of enforcement for offences executed online, a shortage of tools to handle harmful content, difficulties protecting consumers, and more. Thus, they did not see the forest for the trees — they solved one problem and neglected, even exacerbated, other problems.
To change this, first there is a need to see the “forest” — what is the bigger picture? When talking about the social media phenomenon, the “forest” is understanding that social media is a technology for the distribution and consumption of information that generates, alongside progress and new opportunities, unprecedented dangers for society and individuals. From a societal perspective, social media threatens the soundness of democratic institutions. It fragments society into subgroups, increases polarization and hatred between them, and serves as a loophole enabling foreign entities to hit at national security’s soft underbelly. For individuals, unrestrained social media exposes users to dangers of sexual abuse and harassment, causes psychological damage and a decrease in social functions and violates users’ fundamental rights to dignity, a good name, privacy, and even individual freedom. Vulnerable populations, like children and youth, suffer particularly from these types of harm, which could stay with them for their entire lives.
The British Parliament rightfully stated that social media is “one of the defining policy issues of our age.” The problem’s scope necessitates a holistic and broad legislative solution, which will provide a response to the needs of millions of users in Israel. Tachlith Institute proposes a legislative framework that will provide this response. The proposed framework’s overarching concept does not focus on specific violations of the law or community rules, but rather creating incentives for all interested parties, first and foremost social media providers, to create an online environment that is safe throughout. We propose to execute this based on three main components:
- Strengthening the accountability of social media entities
Social media services are an integral part of the daily routine for billions of people, including millions of Israelis. The larger services are administered by a broad, quasi-bureaucratic system that includes community rules, human and algorithm-based mechanisms to rate content and enforce rules, as well as mechanisms for investigating, appealing, and deciding disagreements. The key to creating a safe and free online space is for the system to be attentive to public interests, to fully internalize its wide-reaching social impact, and to provide a suitable response to the needs of users in Israel. Subject to their size and the type of services they operate, social media service providers would be required to fulfill a number of regulatory requirements, including submitting periodical risk assessments, publishing clear community rules that are accessible to users in Israel, implementing a “notice and action” mechanism for the quick removal of unlawful content, and creating digital due process mechanisms to handle harmful content.
- Granting effective enforcement powers to State authorities
The ultimate responsibility for the security and welfare of Israel’s citizens, even online, rests with the Government. It must guarantee that social media spaces do not become a no man’s land and that Israeli law is enforced effectively in these spaces. The Israeli regulator must supervise the impact of social media services on society and individuals in Israel, and have the powers needed for risk management.
Among the recommendations we promote are anchoring a general adjudication authority in Israel and a general obligation to obey judicial orders, regulation of cooperation between enforcement entities and social media service providers, authorizing sectorial regulators to act in defined areas such as education, security, health, and consumer protection, and creating statutory “emergency” mechanisms to guarantee focused, effective, and timely treatment of illegalities in security and other emergencies.
- Empowering users and civil society
Finally, we will act to guarantee that users in Israel have independent tools to control the content they are exposed to and their level of involvement with other users (special protection would be granted to youth in this context). We will also act to guarantee that civil society in Israel serves as a support, acting as an intermediary in the relationship between users, the authorities, and social media service providers.
9. Promoting Human Rights in the Digital Age: The Right to Be Forgotten
The digital age radically changed how we communicate, consume and distribute information, and regulate social relationships in a variety of areas — economics, law, health, community, and even romance. In the new world, where the digital dimension has ever-increasing importance in a person’s life, basic rights, such as the right to privacy, are being reformulated. There are even new rights that have developed as needed in the present reality.
One of these new rights, which some may say has even become a fundamental right, is the right to be forgotten. This right is important for people who want to “start again,” to deal with past traumas, or for those who wish to maintain a modicum of anonymity in an age when our lives are exposed to all online. The main population harmed by the current situation is children and youth, who spend most of their time on social media, without always being cognizant of the digital tracks they leave years forward, and which form their identity, as seen outwards. Another population for which it is important to anchor the right to be forgotten is rehabilitated criminals, who have trouble righting their ways in an era when, even after their criminal record has been erased (after completing their sentence), a digital record of offences remains in a simple google search.
Past attempts to anchor the right to privacy in Israel got caught between the Ministry of Justice and the Knesset because they were part of broad and cumbersome reforms to the Protection of Privacy Law. Unfortunately, citizens who are negatively impacted by the absence of a right to be forgotten do not have the time to untangle the web of obstacles to implementation of a comprehensive reform in privacy law. They need the right to be forgotten now.
Tachlith Institute seeks to promote the thorough and comprehensive anchoring of the right to be forgotten, and to mold a unique tailored framework for this right, as a normative arrangement that conforms to the Israeli legal system and the legal and political “conditions on the ground.” The arrangement we propose will also promote compliance of Israeli law with the laws in practice in many other states throughout the world, particularly the European Union. It will also provide a response for populations that are particularly relevant. Specifically, the anchoring of three tailored arrangements for the right to be forgotten is proposed:
- A broad right for content published with respect to a person who was a minor at the time of publication;
- A right to be forgotten for a person with respect to whom information was published when they were an adult;
- A right to be forgotten that is in line with the Criminal Record Law and the Returnee Regulations, with respect to rehabilitated offenders.
The arrangement proposed in the research would promote modernization of Israeli law, while enhancing the objectives at the foundation of central statutory regimes such as protection of privacy, as well as freedom of expression, all while considering the history of Israel’s tradition and the values that mold our legal system.
10. Consumer Protection in the Digital Sphere
Over the past few years, the use of digital services in Israel has accelerated. Digital services bring many advantages for consumers: They increase the efficiency and speed of service, allow citizens accessibility to all their consumer rights, offer pinpointed and personalized publication, and enable the execution of numerous transactions on the computer screen, without leaving home. Digital social services even help build community and ease feelings of loneliness.
Yet, digital services also have a cost. The heaviest price we as consumers pay is the violation of our individual rights, including the rights to privacy, autonomy, equality, freedom of expression, property, as well as consumer and contract rights. The intensive collection of personal data and accelerated technological developments and digital service use all require a rethinking of the legislation that regulates consumer rights in the age of big data. And yet, while legislation on this topic has been advanced in many states, in Israel outdated legislation still applies, which leaves consumers vulnerable to the violation of rights.
Ostensibly, today the main law that should regulate the protection of user data is the Protection of Privacy Law. But in Israel the Protection of Privacy Law was legislated before the information technology era, and the law has not been amended satisfactorily to handle technological developments. Recently, a number of legislative bills have been advanced on this topic, but they only provide a partial response to data protection risks and do not address significant risks, including profiling and continuous monitoring of users, nor do they address protection of user rights, including the right to data portability, the right to withdraw consent, and the right to contest automated decisions.
The solution we propose to regulate this field is legislating a comprehensive digital information services law, which would create harmony and uniformity in the legal protection of Israeli consumer digital service use. This type of protection would apply to privacy risks as well as risks to other rights, would be easy for citizens to understand, and simple to enforce. This would be achieved while emphasizing formulation of a law whose very characteristics would conform to the age of technology.
11. Literacy and Digital Inclusion (Under Development)
The digital age brought great progress in diverse aspects of life, but data indicates that progress has not occurred equally among states and even among populations. This is true for many states in the world, and particularly the State of Israel, where there are groups that suffer from inequality in many areas, which is exacerbated by challenges in the field of technology.
Gaps in readiness or accessibility to digital tools are currently a major barrier to social mobility for disadvantaged populations. In addition, even for parts of the population that enjoy high accessibility to technology, there is limited readiness to confront the massive societal implications of the technological revolution for all areas of life: education, welfare, health, and even security. For a state that strives for progress and technological leadership, this situation cannot be tolerated. It is important to examine how the shift to the digital world has impacted different groups of people, and what might be the implications of progress that is unequal or does not include satisfactory literacy tools.
On the basic level, a central obstacle to achieving digital inclusion is the very ability to physically or technically connect to the internet (due to physical and economic barriers, such as unequal coverage of infrastructure throughout the world, bandwidth deficiencies, high costs and more). In addition, there are socio-cultural barriers, where groups or their leaders discourage participation in the digital sphere for religious, cultural, or moral reasons. These gaps to internet access, which are called “the digital divide,” prevent access to essential services in society, which have been transferred, partially or fully, to the digital sphere. They thereby widen the economic and social divide between those who are connected to the internet and those who are not.
Tachlith Institute is conducting a series of policy studies to understand and close the ever-increasing digital divide. This issue is important for the individual and their self-determination, for the community and its strength, and for the State of Israel which hosts numerous groups which must cooperate optimally in order to promote a shared, prosperous future. As part of building an up-to-date vision for the State of Israel on the day after October 7, it is important to enlist government and civil service entities in the advancement of digital inclusion and empowering individuals through technology. It is vital to turn our society into one that understands technology, is ready for it, and is prepared to harness it to promote its goals with equality between different groups and between urban and nonurban areas.
The building blocks: our policy solutions
In the lines below, we will outline the policy areas we are presently working on to formulate the cornerstones of the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative. The policy areas selected reflect the Institute’s existing areas of expertise, adjusted to the “Ahad Ha’am” Initiative’s Archimedean points, and places where we feel we can make a significant contribution. Naturally, various policy solutions are in different stages of work and readiness, and some reflect research activities that commenced before October 7. Our work’s modularity makes it possible to respond to changes in the political reality and national priorities, by concentrating efforts on particular areas among those we research, as well as new fields.
הגישו מועמדות כאן !
לורם איפסום דולור סיט אמט, קונסקטורר אדיפיסינג אלית נולום ארווס סאפיאן
